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ABSTRACT: Modelling argumentation as a dialogue brings distinct advantages over monological ap-
proaches to analysing actual argumentation. Yet, models of dialogue are typically built of di-logical ex-
changes between two parties (pro and con). By contrast, many public arguments and deliberations are in 
fact poly-logues involving many parties. I argue that salient features of polylogues (the possibility for col-
lective (counter-)argument, departures from a simple ababab sequential organisation of exchanges, etc.) are 
theoretically significant for analysing and evaluating public argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a European country at the height of the global financial crisis. Its economy is not 
really getting any better, and the public budget deficit is soaring. The country is even said 
to be on the verge of bankruptcy. Therefore, the minority, centre-left government is try-
ing to push through a tough austerity budget in the parliament. The government faces a 
number of smaller opposition parties—some to the left, and some to the right. At least 
some of them have to be convinced and vote for the budget, or at least abstain from vot-
ing against it. Simplifying things, the situation looks more or less like this:     
 
Government—centre-left party 
This is the best, balanced budget 
 
 
 Leftist parties    Centre-right party 
 We need less cuts for public workers, We need more cuts in the  
 more tax-increases (esp. for the rich) public sector, less tax- increases 
Fig. 1. Simplified argumentative situation 
In such a situation, not uncommon in European policy debates, the government has to 
fight on two fronts, since it is challenged from two opposing directions. Leftists and 
rightists criticise the government, but also each other, on the basis of their own, not fully 
compatible ideological and economical starting points. This puts the government in the 
following predicament: How to consistently answer the leftists’ challenge that the budget 
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is bad, for it cuts too much of public wages, and, at the same time, the rightists’ challenge 
that the budget is bad, for it cuts too little of public wages? The choice of the government 
may be to simply address one opponent. Let us assume that the votes of one centre-right 
party are enough to have the budget accepted. So the ruling party takes up the challenge 
and defends its position on this front. Imagine that it is strong arguments, and not political 
concessions and behind-the-scenes deals, that convince the right-wing opposition to ab-
stain during the voting. The government can pride itself on a reasonable and successful 
argumentative strategy. Yet, there is a little hitch. The leftists’ objections have not been 
addressed. From the perspective of the government vs. leftists debate, government’s ar-
guments are evasive and irrelevant. That is to say, they are fallacious. Moreover, they are 
also rhetorically ineffective: the leftists vote against the budget. In this situation, an ar-
gumentation analyst faces the following paradox: the same arguments in a public debate 
are both reasonable and fallacious at the same time. How can this be? 
 Well, one may say that this kind of situation is a purely imaginary, constructed 
exemption. Yet, public deliberation of the kind illustrated above is no alien to argumenta-
tion studies. Collective deliberation can be crudely defined as a multi-party decision-
making procedure that necessarily involves public argumentation. (Despite significantly 
differing views, this much is common in all accounts of collective deliberation from Aris-
totle to recent proponents of deliberative democracy. See Yack 2006.) Deliberation thus 
combines two crucial elements: the process of argumentation and many parties. For 
some, these two elements even lie at the very heart of the study of logic and argumenta-
tion: “Logic arose originally out of reflection on many-agent practices of disputation”, 
and thus was founded on a “broader agenda of rational agency and intelligent interaction” 
(van Benthem 2009: vii; see also Krabbe 2006). In spite of such historical roots of argu-
mentation studies, there seems to remain an important difficulty in adequately analysing 
and evaluating multi-party argumentative practices. The difficulty is this: How to recon-
struct and evaluate the multi-party practices in terms of the models of sound argumenta-
tion developed in normative disciplines (logic, dialectics)? More precisely, shall we split 
the many-agent practices into a collection of monological acts of reasoning, and evaluate 
them one by one? Or rather approach them in terms of dialectical encounters in which two 
parties argue “on both sides of the issue”? Or, yet differently, shall we altogether abandon 
such reductions and perhaps look into the whole complex fabric of multi-party argumenta-
tive interactions? In the following, I endeavour to briefly analyse each of these options. 
2. MONOLOGUE (A COLLECTION OF MONOLOGUES) 
Many logicians may be inclined to analyse argumentation as a form of monologue. They 
would thus approach multi-party public debates as collections of individual acts of rea-
soning. An act of reasoning consists of a set of arguments and arguments are defined as 
sets of claims supporting another claim through an identifiable inference rule. Proponents 
of this perspective acknowledge, of course, that so defined arguments may be, and often 
explicitly are, part of interaction, but the substance of arguing is the way every single 
discussant justifies her own position. Whether acts of reasoning belong to the context of 
monological, confirmatory justification or to the context of rebutting objections in a criti-
cal dialogue is an attribute, possibly an accidental one. On a radical interpretation, the 
contingencies of interaction—the very presence and contributions of other arguers—
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become, to borrow an expression from Grice (1975: 42), “undesirable excrescences,” that 
unnecessarily obfuscate the theoretical and analytic picture which should, first and fore-
most, clearly focus on the primary object of argumentation studies, that is, the monologi-
cal structure of inferences.
1
 
 This depiction looks like a crude simplification, or perhaps even a caricature, of 
a well-known tradition in logic, stemming from Aristotle’s account of demonstration. 
However, the line of research based on the principles sketched above is still very lively or 
perhaps even dominant. Monological logicians who make inroads into argumentation 
theory argue, for example, that argumentative moves that are commonly considered falla-
cious on dialectical grounds—petitio pricipii or fallacy of many questions (see Hamblin 
1970)—can be fully elucidated “on entirely logistical principles” in a way “closely re-
sembling the Standard Treatment” (Botting 2011: 23). Such a position implies that any 
extension of the scope of argument analysis beyond monological acts of reasoning is ba-
sically redundant and thus does not pass the test of Occam’s razor. 
 Consistent and powerful as it is, such a position involves strong reductionism. 
That is because much of what we routinely find important in argumentative exchanges is 
excluded from examination.
2
 In particular, a monological stance makes is utterly difficult 
to test the comparative strength of various positions regarding the same issue. Various 
positions may be supported by valid chains of inferences, and thus the crucial test would 
depend on the strength of the basic premises assumed by each of the party. But this is not 
exactly a logician’s concern. It would be, if factors such as responsiveness to other par-
ties’ objections regarding these premises, as well the position at large, were within the 
scope of inquiry. Yet they are not, at least in a monologically constructed logical system. 
“Acceptable premises” are often defined as those that, in a nut-shell, face no overriding 
reasons to the contrary (Freeman 2005). By including “reasons to the contrary” in the 
definition of acceptable premises, however, we introduce the second party—a critic—to 
the process of reasoning. Following Aristotle (Topics), we can thus say that whenever the 
premises become disputable, we abandon the monological activity of proof-making, or 
demonstration, and enter the realm of dialectics. 
3. DILOGUE (A COLLECTION OF DILOGUES) 
The inherently monological tenets of much of logical inquiry are fiercely contested by the 
proponents of dialectical approaches. For dialecticians, again indebted to Aristotle, argu-
mentation is a particular form of communicative exchange, in which what matters are not 
only justifications but also, or even primarily, criticisms of the other party. On such a 
view, conditions for reconstruction and assessment of argumentation are essentially dia-
logical: It is in the dialogically reconstructed competitive weighing of pros and cons 
where the value of arguments is, and indeed should be, established. Therefore, a step 
“from axiom to dialogue” is advocated (Barth & Krabbe 1982). 
 Proponents of a dialogical stance speak of a “straightjacket of logic,” and inter-
pret the seemingly monological core of reasoning as either a form of a dialogue game 
                                                 
1 Johnson (2000) uses the term “illative core” to refer to this monological core of inferences. 
2  In O’Keefe’s (1977) terms, monological logicians are only interested in arguments1, or even only in a 
particular subset of such arguments, and not in arguments2. 
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with God himself (Lorenzen & Lorenz 1978: 1; as cited in Walton & Krabbe 1995: 3) or, 
after Plato, as an internal discussion of the soul with herself (see Theaetetus, 189e-190a; 
The Sophist, 263e-264b). Monological chains of inferences are thus no more than mani-
festations, or end results, of “interiorized dialogic argument” (Kuhn 1991: 13). In this 
way, monologue is defined through dialogue, not the other way round (dialogue is in the 
definiens of monologue). 
 To many argumentation scholars, bringing such arguments for an inherently dia-
logic character of argumentation is like trying to break into a door that is wide open. Dia-
lectics is by definition a dialogic enterprise: “In the dialectical approach to argumentation 
it is assumed that in arguments there are always two roles in play, even when just one 
person is putting forward an argument so that the role of the Opponent remains implicit 
(monologues)” (Krabbe 2006: 196). The central notion of dialectical inquiry is thus the 
notion of a ‘dialogue.’ However, whereas the Greek meaning of ‘dialogue’ is not limited 
to two-party exchanges, argumentation theory seems to favour such a two-party approach 
to dialogue. Dia-logue thus becomes reduced to di-logue, a conversation between two. A 
short look at the definitions of dialogue in informal logic and argumentation theory clear-
ly indicates this tendency (italics added): 
A dialogue is an extended verbal exchange between two people (in its simplest form), in 
which the parties take turns responding to what the other said in one or more of the preceding 
turns. (Blair 1998: 325) 
 
The concept of a dialogue […] is that of a conventionalized, purposive joint activity between 
two parties (in the simplest case), where the parties act as speech partners. It is meant by this 
that the two parties exchange verbal messages or so-called speech acts that take the form of 
moves in a game-like sequence of exchanges. (Walton 1998: 29) 
 
The root meaning of dialectical is dialogue—a logos (which I take to mean “reasoned dis-
course”) that is between two (or more) people. (Johnson 2000: 161) 
What is noticeable in such definitions is that the possibility of having more than two dis-
cussants is mentioned somewhat timidly and more often than not parenthetically. Worse 
yet, the parenthetical distraction is sometimes dropped altogether: “As was clear in our 
discussion of the process, arguing involves two participants; or if you prefer, it has two 
poles and the process takes place between those poles” (Johnson 2000: 157).    
 The question is—does this reduction of argumentative interactions to basically 
dyadic exchanges bring about any important limitations/problems to the analysis and 
evaluation of argumentation? Is such a reduction of many to two similar in any sense to 
the reduction of two to one? That is to say, is dialectics guilty of a similar abstraction 
from the practice of argumentation that it so strongly criticises monological logic for? 
 Well, not exactly. The limitation of the scope of dialectical inquiry to two parties 
can be explained by the way dialectical issues are formulated. For example, Krabbe re-
constructs the first step in the Aristotelian system of argumentative discussions, in which 
the very roots of dialectical study lie, in the following way: “Discussion starts with a 
problem that can be expressed by a question of the form: Is it the case that…, or is it 
not?” (2006: 186). That means that a dialectical issue is raised by a yes/no or polar ques-
tion. Such a question only allows for two kinds of relevant responses (leaving aside the “I 
don’t know” answer). Therefore, any controversial issue allows for two sides to form: 
those who say yes and those who say no. As a result, in each dialectical encounter 
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“[t]here are two roles: the Questioner (Q) and the Answerer (A)” (Krabbe 2006: 186). 
These two dialectical roles are alternatively called the proponent and opponent, the pro-
tagonist and antagonist, or, by analogy to the game of chess, White and Black (Walton & 
Krabbe 1995: 133-154). 
 These roles are certainly realistic enough, as they form the basis of much actual 
argumentative discourse, most obviously in legal proceedings, often considered a proto-
type of argumentative exchange. A legal question that opens a criminal trial, e.g. “Is Soc-
rates guilty of corrupting youth?”, clearly calls for a defence and prosecution to clash in a 
battle of arguments. However, also many issues raised in deliberative assembly take the 
form of a polar question: “Shall we go to war with Sparta?” may be one example of such 
a question. Again, to test whose position holds, and thus decide if Spartans are to be wor-
ried or not, two parties engage in an argumentative exchange. 
 As we know, dialectical scholars developed various normative models of two-
party discussions to regulate such exchanges (Barth & Krabbe 1982; van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1984, 2004; Hamblin 1970; Walton 1984; Walton & Krabbe 1995). Some, 
however, claim that such models do not quite capture everything that is relevant to argu-
mentation. Blair, for instance, in his paper “The limits of the dialogue model of argu-
ment,” challenges the view that “that dialogue is a necessary condition of argument, that 
arguments always occur in a context of dialogue” (1998: 326). Blair argues that in long 
argumentative texts, such as philosophical treaties or scholarly monographs, argumenta-
tion is predominantly built of “solo arguments” in which an arguer “is not forced by ques-
tions or challenges from the other side to address additional issues that the critic deems 
important” (1998: 333). Such arguments are thus decidedly different from “duet argu-
ments” characteristic of “‘fully-engaged’ argument-dialogues,” that is, actual argumenta-
tive interactions in which “what is supplied by each participant at each turn is a direct 
response to what was stated or asked in the previous turn” (Blair 1998: 329). Since So-
cratic dialogues, Walton’s dialogue types, or the pragma-dialectical critical discussion are 
all models of fully-engaged dialogues, their study, so Blair concludes, “will not suffice to 
reveal all the salient properties of solo argumentation, nor all the norms appropriate to 
them” (1998: 338). 
 One may be tempted to swiftly disagree with such a stance that seems to resusci-
tate the monological take on the nature of argumentation. However, two elements of 
Blair’s argument make his position worthy of serious consideration. First, Blair hedges 
his position in an important way. In fact, he distinguishes between two senses of a dia-
logue. One is an abstract and minimal sense, in which a dialogue amounts to envisaging a 
possible opposition; this includes internal dialogues and the anticipation of objections in a 
longer monological stretch of discourse. What crucially remains in such a view is that, in a 
Platonic fashion, dialogue is in the definiens of thinking cum reasoning. Second is a dia-
logue in the proper sense, understood as an interaction between two (or more) people who 
are mutually engaged by taking turns and thus co-producing argumentation. Blair challeng-
es the latter, but not the former view. That is to say, he is not against a dialogical (or rather 
a “dialectical”) view of argumentation, but rather against a strong dialogical view. 
 The second salient element of Blair’s argument is the overall rationale for his criti-
cisms. Namely, he wishes to account for the complications argument scholars may face once 
they depart from the simple abab (question-answer; argument-objection) form of dialogue: 
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I have attempted to characterize argument-dialogues according to increasing levels of the 
complexity of the argument ingredient at each turn of a dialogue. I contend that at a certain 
stage in the increasing complexity of the argument turns, there is a qualitative change in the 
nature of the dialogue. (Blair 1998: 327) 
I find Blair’s point well-taken. Yet, myself, I focus on the “qualitative change in the na-
ture of the dialogue” brought about by a move in exactly the opposite direction. Rather 
than looking into the increasing complexity of individual turns in a dialogue between two 
parties, I look into the increasing complexity in the interactional structure of the dialogue 
between more than two parties.
3
 That is because the two-party approach generates its own 
problems in analysing and evaluating multi-party argumentative exchanges in a way that 
is both pragmatically sensitive and dialectically relevant. 
 Argumentation scholars have noticed some of such difficulties and proposed 
corresponding amendments to the basic one-on-one scheme. One possibility is to recon-
struct the variety of positions under discussion as a dispute between two basic collective 
parties (see Prakken 2009: 286). Thus the duality of dialectics is preserved, but some 
practical, rhetorical considerations are added. One of them is the phenomenon of argu-
mentative coalitions: arguers in group situations tend to team up around an issue and thus 
co-produce arguments as a collective protagonist, or “tag-team” (Brashers & Meyers 
1989; Canary, Brossmann, & Seibold 1987). Reversely, discussants can also form a col-
lective antagonist and jointly object to various elements of their opponent’s position 
(Lewiński, 2010). Both complexity and persuasiveness of collectively produced argu-
ments tends to be higher than individual ones. However, while justified in many cases, 
such reconstructions may also result in a loss of nuance whenever a dispute involves a 
complicated web of mutually incompatible positions and arguments. In effect, a possible 
simplification of the disagreement space towards a dichotomization, or even false dilem-
ma (either… or…), is possible. Another rhetorically important option is to reconstruct the 
variety of positions under discussion as a dispute between two basic collective parties that 
additionally take into consideration the more or less passive audience of the exchange.
4
 
There is thus a situation of an argumentative overlay. One discussion party explicitly ar-
gues with the other party, but implicitly, and perhaps even primarily, manoeuvres to 
reach out to the audience that may be skeptical about her position (see van Eemeren, 
2010). Much of political debate in the public sphere has a similar structure, in which what 
really counts are potential voters that need to be addressed. This is another important ex-
tension of the dualistic model to account for some real life, rhetorical elements. Still, it 
presupposes a hierarchy of addressees (primary and secondary), that sometimes may be 
difficult to tell. Crucially, however, in many cases the neutrality or passivity of the third 
party does not hold. The third party is not necessarily a collection of onlookers that are 
merely supposed to have their own dissenting opinions, but otherwise remain silent and 
thus play a largely implicit role in an argumentative dialogue. Rather, a third party may 
actively contribute to a discussion actually extending it beyond two-party argumentative 
exchanges. This complication brings us to the third option.   
                                                 
3  Using O’Keefe’s terminology again: while Blair calls for extending dialectical analysis of arguments1 
(see also Blair 2010), my goal is to further the analysis of arguments2. See also the distinction between 
“illative core” and “dialectical tier” (Johnson 2000). 
4  Prakken, in his formalization of a persuasion dialogue, proposes that “[t]he remaining participants, if 
any, are the third parties with respect to t, assumed to be neutral towards t” (2009: 286). 
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4. POLYLOGUE 
A polylogue is a form of verbal interaction, or dialogue, that involves “or more” partici-
pants. The simplest form of a polylogue is a tri-logue: a dialogue between three parties. 
The notion has been introduced by pragmatic discourse and conversation analysts (Ker-
brat-Orecchioni 2004). Since more than a dyadic exchange is not thoroughly theorised in 
argumentation studies, an incentive to do such work may come exactly from the pragmat-
ic investigation of polylogues. Already classics of interaction analysis, such as Goffman, 
have identified the methodological limitations in the study of spoken dialogues:   
Traditional analysis of saying and what gets said seems tacitly committed to the following 
paradigm: Two and only two individuals are engaged together in it. […] The two-person ar-
rangement […] being the one that informs the underlying imagery we have about face-to-face 
interaction. (Goffman 1981: 129) 
To substantiate the claims that a dyadic model of interaction is not adequate to all cases of 
dialogues, analysts of polylogue identified a number of qualities of polylogues that extend 
beyond the dyadic model: the much increased complexity of exchanges; the problem in 
determining the completeness of exchanges and the related issue of distributed responsibil-
ity for talking (which of the addressed parties is to answer a difficult question?); the perils 
of inconsistency in multiple-recipient design; various forms of co-production of discourse 
that may lead to strategic coalition-building; difficulties in gauging and establishing the 
common ground among all the participants, and so on (Bruxelles & Kerbrat-Orecchioni 
2004; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1997, 2004). At least some of these qualities are potentially rele-
vant to argumentation analysis. An interesting example may be the reconstruction of a pol-
ylogue in terms of the basic dialectical exchange of turns between two parties:   
As for the alternating pattern, the famous ababab formula only works for dilogues, whereas 
for trilogues the alternation does not respect any kind of fixed rules: we are dealing with an 
infinite number of possibilities, the abcabcabc model being very exceptional […]” (Kerbrat-
Orecchioni 1997: 5) 
The challenge for an analyst may thus be to extract from a multi-party discussion the  
abab order on which the much-used “dialectical profiles” are based (see van Eemeren, 
Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007).   
 Taking such concerns into account, interaction analysts go as far as bemoaning the 
“straightjacket of first and second persons” resulting from the “bias towards the study of 
dyadic interaction” (Levinson 1988: 222-223). Such a bias may lead to an important inade-
quacy in understanding verbal exchanges, since “in any society, dyadic exchanges tend, in 
fact, to be in the minority” (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004: 2). If pure, prototypical one-on-one 
interactions are indeed a rarity, then the models of interaction built of adjacency pairs do 
not meet the basic requirement of empirical adequacy. And the chief goal of interaction 
analysts is to faithfully represent the structure or order underlying actual discursive ex-
changes. Therefore, the models they propose are descriptive models, whose shape is direct-
ly dependent on the shape of actual interactions. As a result, a misfit between the actual 
qualities of interactions that are relevant from a given research perspective (for instance, 
sequential organization), and their representation in the model may seriously undermine the 
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usefulness of the model. Hence the need of studying polylogues is relevant and indeed cru-
cial to understanding the complex structure of much of our interactions. 
 In contrast, argumentation theorists primarily aim at stipulating normative models 
of reasonable argumentative exchanges. The basic function of such models is not to picture 
reality, but rather to propose certain ideal conditions under which reasonable argumentation 
can be exercised in an uninhibited fashion. In this way, such models provide tools for dis-
tinguishing the good from the bad in argumentation. Because of that they are not, and 
should not, be directly affected by the complexities of argumentative reality. The question 
remains though if such models can be indirectly affected. That is to say, can some complex-
ities of argumentative exchanges trickle all the way down to the normative models so as to 
affect the normative standards? How about some moves that are reasonable in a one-on-one 
exchange becoming unreasonable in a many-to-many exchange, and the other way round? 
 Such points have been noticed, for instance, by Bonevac in his assessment of the 
pragma-dialectical model: 
[…] many discussions […] involve more than two participants with different and mutually 
incompatible standpoints. Why does this matter? Success in such a discussion may be more 
than success against each opponent. Someone seeking to defend a position against a variety 
of opponents at once, for example, must meet a number of constraints that cannot be under-
stood as conjunctions of constraints applied to each dispute taken individually. (Bonevac 
2003: 454-455) 
As an example of such discussions he mentions deliberations in American politics: presi-
dent Clinton, Bonevac argues, often had to argue simultaneously against reservations of 
his own Democratic party members and objections of the Republicans. In this way, Clin-
ton did not just argue on one of the two sides of the issue, but rather “maneuvered by tri-
angulation” in that “he was implicitly or explicitly criticizing two different opponents and 
seeking to appeal to groups of voters positioned between them on the political spectrum” 
(Bonevac 2003: 453). Without taking such factors into account, Bonevac claims, one 
cannot fully understand Clinton’s argumentative strategies. 
 Such reservations regarding dialectical models of argumentation would not real-
ly hold if not two important assumptions that Bonevac is not at all explicit about. The 
first is that dialectics is based on an inadequate model of interaction. In his criticisms 
Bonevac, a formal deductive logician himself, seems to be saying that purely abstract 
logical models of solo inferences are fine, for they remain within the realm of formal sci-
ence and thus do not have any aspiration at getting close to reality. However, once one 
wants to construct normative models of argumentation that include the interactive aspect of 
it, this has to be done on the basis of a certain basic model of interaction. And the model 
based on two and only two speakers cum arguers is not adequate. But why would pragma-, 
or any other, dialecticians care about this if, as shown above, they deal with polar issues? 
 A second crucial assumption addresses exactly this question. The problem of 
multi-party discussions arises only if one allows taking as a point of departure for argu-
mentative discussions not only a polar yes/no question, but also an open Wh-question: 
“Which neighbour shall we ally with?” or “Who shall we vote for?” or “What cuts shall 
we introduce to our budget?” Such questions are by definition open-ended and thus usual-
ly afford more than two relevant responses. 
 It is interesting to notice that the Wh-questions may actually be seen as the 
trademark of an initial situation for decision-making: an open problem that allows for a 
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number of alternatives that are to be tested in an argumentative process (McBurney, 
Hitchcock, & Parsons 2007: 97-99; Walton & Krabbe 1995: 73-75). Such a departure 
point for deliberation allows for systematically including more than two parties to the 
debate, because there may be more than just two sides to an issue raised by a Wh-
question. In answering a question such as “Which austerity measures to introduce?” some 
may be in favour of raising rich people’s taxes, other of cutting poor people’s benefits, or 
reducing employment in public sector, stimulating the economy with public money, or 
perhaps raising corporate tax, and so on. In this way we obtain a rather bulky set of posi-
tions, some of them contradictory, some contrary, and some compatible (so that they can 
be combined in distinct ways). And this is usually the situation in which public delibera-
tors argue for their positions and against the positions of others.     
 Such multiplicity of positions is taken into account in some models of decision-
making (see McBurney, Hitchcock, & Parsons 2007; Rehg, McBurney, & Parsons 2004). 
Yet, in such models advocates of various positions are deliberative parties that resort not 
only to arguments, but also proposals, counter-proposals, voting, majority deals, etc. As 
soon as deliberative exchanges turn to argumentation, understood as a critical testing of 
the merits of the proposals in a dialectical exchange, the interaction comes down to two 
parties (see Prakken 2000, 2009). Hence multi-agent is limited to two-agent again. 
Prakken (2009: 287) suggests that argumentation, in contrast to deliberation, is a con-
flictual zero-sum game, in which there is but one winner and one loser. On such a view, 
no more than two dialectical parties can exist. But can’t there be more? 
 It depends exactly on the answer to the question if argumentative exchanges can 
be occasioned by a Wh-question. If Krabbe (2006) is correct in his analysis, it did not 
seem possible in the classical Aristotelian system. Yet, some present approaches seem to 
allow such a possibility. This is evident when different kinds of confrontations or dis-
putes are examined. Pragma-dialectics, for instance, includes among the types of disputes 
a “qualitatively multiple dispute.” Such a dispute arises when the second speaker “takes 
up an alternative standpoint […] [that], viewed dialectically, implies a standpoint that is 
opposite to [the first speaker’s standpoint]” (van Eemeren et al. 2007: 26 f.). An opposite 
standpoint may be both contradictory and contrary to the other position (ibid.: 57-62). 
Moreover, a qualitatively mixed dispute may clearly arise in response to a Wh-question 
which may open a discussion of various alternatives. Van Eemeren et al. analyse many 
examples of such disputes, including this: 
Where can we still see a glimmer of hope in that terrible genocide in Kosovo? That hope 
does not lie in a victory for NATO or a victory for the Kosovo Liberation Army, UCK. And 
certainly not in a victory for Milosevic. (quoted in van Eemeren et al. 2007: 61) 
Although van Eemeren et al. reconstruct this dispute in terms of a dyadic exchange, it is 
also plausible to see it as a clash of at least three contrary positions advocated by different 
parties: that NATO will bring peace to Kosovo, that UCK will do it, or that Milosevic 
will. The author of the newspaper commentary is adamantly against Milosevic, and quite 
doubtful about two other options: NATO and UCK. Perhaps he argues for some kind of a 
fourth solution, but this is not clear in the quoted fragment. What is clear, though, is that 
we deal here with a conflict of contrary opinions in a qualitatively multiple dispute. 
 Still, dialectical accounts seem to fall short of investigating the intricacies of the 
discussion between two contrary positions. By definition, such positions cannot be both 
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correct, yet they can be both wrong. And this is exactly because there is a third (or fourth, 
etc.) position that is correct. The problem remains how to introduce this third or fourth 
position into a dialectical analysis. The most common solution seems to be splitting a 
multi-party dispute into elementary disputes between two parties. Van Rees, in her re-
sponse to Bonevac’s reservations, identifies this point as the main challenge: “The ques-
tion then is […] whether multi-party discussions can be fruitfully viewed as a number of 
dualistic exchanges” (van Rees 2003: 461). Her answer is yes, and this is exactly what I 
would like to carefully look at towards the end of this paper. 
 There have certainly been successful attempts to analytically break a multi-party 
discussion into a collection of di-logues. Feteris, for instance, analysed court proceedings 
that involve at least three parties (prosecution, defence, and the judge) as two simultane-
ous critical discussions: between prosecution and the judge, and defence and the judge 
(1999: Ch. 11). Yet, criminal trials are a very special institutional activity that exactly 
allows or even enforces such a division. Moreover, issues in criminal law are delineated 
by the yes/no question regarding the guilt of the accused. Van Rees, however, seems to 
make a more general claim: 
[In pragma-dialectics] It is fully well recognized that in practice, an arguer may address vari-
ous opponents with an argument. In fact, the very conception of complex argumentation in 
pragma-dialectics takes into account the fact that an argument may seek to convince several 
different opponents at the same time (Snoeck Henkemans 1992). […]. (van Rees 2003: 461) 
The crucial point of this position lies in the definition of “several different opponents.” 
There seem to be two possibilities: Either these multiple antagonists belong to the same 
dyadic critical discussion, and then the protagonist is facing one collective antagonist. So 
in fact there is no multiplicity of discussions, and thus no need to split anything. Or, each 
antagonist belongs to a different discussion and possibly employs different starting 
points. But then we can hardly talk of the protagonist defending himself with one com-
plex argumentation that requires, for example, consistency or relevance. In pragma-
dialectics, similarly to other dialectical approaches, even if the standpoint defended is the 
same, one does not have to be consistent across two different critical discussions with dif-
ferent antagonists employing different starting points (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003). 
Yet, since many political discussions take place in one public sphere, a charge of incon-
sistency may be justified, at least from the perspective of the participants. Analogically, the 
problem of relevance arises. Two antagonists may disagree with me for contradictory rea-
sons. Yet, they attack the very same argument of mine. Now, my defence is relevant to the 
challenge of one of them, but irrelevant to the other’s. Hence, depending on which dyad we 
analyse as part of one critical discussion, the same move is once good and once bad. Again, 
I do not have to be relevant across discussions, but we have one public discussion here. 
 I will illustrate these problems by presenting a simplified dialectical exchange in 
a manner crudely corresponding to the analysis of dialectical profiles. Let us return to the 
budget debate. In the following, A is a centre-left government, B is a leftist opposition, C 
a centre-right opposition. In the argumentation stage, B’s and C’s critical reactions target 
either the propositional content or the justificatory potential of A’s argumentation. The 
tri-logue goes as follows: 
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(1)  A. This is a good budget, because it introduces austerity measures 
 
(2) B. Why would a good budget  C. Does it really introduce  
 be characterised by austerity?  austerity? 
 
(3)  A. In these hard times, it has to be A. Yes, there are cuts in public 
sector and tax-increases 
 
(4) B. OK, but why this kind of austerity?  C. Not enough job cuts  
 
(5)  A. It is the best balance between job cuts + tax-increases 
 
(6)  B & C. Is it really the best balance? 
   
(7)  A. We consulted all experts—this is best we can do 
 
(8)  B. No, our experts: Too many  C. No, our experts: Too many 
 cuts, too few increases    increases, too few cuts 
 
(9) A. No, just small cuts, and   A. No, 5% salary cuts for all public 
 a big enough VAT rise   workers, just a bit more VAT tax 
 [or] 
 (no separate response here) 
 
(10)  B. We won—“NO” vote    C. OK you won—“ABSTAIN” vote   
 
Fig. 2. Simplified dialectical exchange 
In this example of public deliberation we have two concurrent discussions: between A 
and B, and between A and C (let us leave the B vs. C debate aside). Initially, B and C 
examine different elements of A’s argumentation. But turns 5 to 7 are directly relevant to 
both discussions, and thus the debate merges into one (A is facing one collective antago-
nist). In 8, however, both opponents attack one and the same argument of A with contra-
dictory counterarguments. To successfully shield from this attack on both fronts in turn 9, 
A risks inconsistency, and thus the prospect of losing both discussions. Therefore, in-
stead, A strategically chooses to respond only to C; practically speaking, convincing this 
opponent alone allows A to have the budget approved in the parliament (while B’s sup-
port would not suffice). From the perspective of A vs. C discussion, A’s turn 9 is a rele-
vant and also successful response, as C decides to abstain from voting against the budget. 
But we have an empty slot in A vs. B debate. As analysts, we can treat such an empty slot 
either as a lack of response, in which case we deal with evasion of burden of proof, and 
thus a fallacy; or we take the response given C as part of this discussion too. But then B 
immediately wins the discussion ex concessis by saying “you said it yourself!” In any case, 
the problem arises of how to evaluate A’s argument in turn 9: as reasonable and successful, 
unreasonable but successful, reasonable but unsuccessful or even unreasonable and unsuc-
cessful? It all seems to depend on which dialectical dyad we take under scrutiny. 
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 Moreover, the splitting into dyads may open the problem of establishing the final 
outcome of the discussion. In this example, leftists defeated the government, but the gov-
ernment defeated right-wingers, a bigger and strategically more important opponent. 
However, imagine that in a direct parliamentary exchange between the two opposition 
parties, the speakers for the right-wing party defeat the leftists. So B > A > C but… C > 
B! Whose arguments are then strongest and whose position should prevail according to 
the rules of critical testing? Such a problem of establishing outcome is known from sport 
tournaments, including chess: in a direct encounter a White player may win over Black, 
Black defeats Yellow, and Yellow defeats White. Even though we know perfectly well 
who the better player in each game is, we do not know who the best player of the three is.  
 It remains to be seen how many of these troubles of reconstruction and evalua-
tion can be solved by further advances in a detailed, context-sensitive analysis of argu-
mentative dialogues. In particular the study of strategic manoeuvring in various commu-
nicative activity types belonging to the genre of deliberation may prove useful in answer-
ing the questions posed above. Pragma-dialectical attentiveness to the various kinds of 
audiences (multiple and mixed, primary and secondary; see van Eemeren 2010) seems to 
facilitate this task. One of the crucial complications in such a study of deliberation would 
be the somewhat paradoxical notion of strategic manoeuvring “between” discussions: I 
argue against B in a rhetorically sloppy, or perhaps even fallacious way, in order to estab-
lish a strategically good position against C. Such manoeuvring may possibly be both rea-
sonable and fallacious, and has a persuasive success as its ultimate goal, so it seems to 
fall within the basic definition. Yet, it requires the stretching of the notion beyond rhetorical 
efficiency in dealing with dialectical sub-tasks in one and the same critical discussion. 
 Such complications of multi-party deliberation may lead to fallacies that are not 
necessarily committed by a sloppy or sly arguer, but rather by an arguer strategically de-
fending herself in a context quite different from a bi-polar discussion between one propo-
nent and one opponent. And I mean this difference in a way contrary to Walton’s (1998) 
idea of relative reasonableness being judged differently in different dialogue types. While 
Walton’s aim is to present different two-party dialogues as having divergent goals, and 
thus also rules, for me the goal of reasonable argumentation is always the same, yet the 
path to reach it is different exactly because there are more than two parties. What does 
such a different path involve? By analogy to games, and indeed any rule-governed behav-
iour, this difference can be described on the level of rules (how to play the game) and the 
level of strategies (how to play it well). Starting from the latter: the rather strange idea of 
strategic manoeuvring between a number of dyadic discussions, can be replaced by a 
concept of a global strategy in one discussion with many parties. Such a global strategy 
may involve coalition-building, including shifts of alliances, various kinds of strategic 
feints, such as simulated attacks and retreats, good cop/bad cop strategies, and so on. All 
these are relevant points not only by sheer analogy to a multi-party military conflict or 
some games, but simply because they are genuine problems of everyday public argumen-
tation. Taking into account the polylogical aspect of it can perhaps lead to a more fine-
grained account of argumentative strategies in collective deliberation.  
 In terms of the very rules of the game, an argumentative polylogue should depart 
from di-logical models of dialectical exchanges in as few points as possible. The basic 
rules would certainly remain the same, if only because we deal with argumentation, rather 
than some other activity such as bargaining. Some amendments can possibly concern 
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different sequential requirements (who is to respond to a challenge, whose criticisms are 
to be first dealt with), the common starting points (do they have to be established among 
all, or some of the parties), relevance and consistency of arguments directed to a diverse 
group of opponents, and, notably, different winning and losing rules (is the winner the 
one who conquers one of the opponents, or all of them?). If such work indeed proves use-
ful, the polylogical game of argumentation should be very similar to, yet different from a 
dyadic dialectics. A stimulating analogy may come from a game of chess: there are quite 
a few models of “chess for three,” in which next to the White and Black, Yellow (or Red) 
player is situated in the same board.  
5. CONCLUSION  
The intricacies of multi-party discussions seem to pose intriguing challenges for argu-
mentation theory as much as for the practice of argumentation in the public sphere. The 
promise of seriously considering argumentative polylogues is to abandon what seems to 
be a false dilemma: either we have argumentation or a game of chess between two par-
ties, or we are doing something else (deliberating, playing snooker) among many parties. 
And dodging the dilemma can possibly enhance our understanding and evaluation of 
multi-party public deliberation. 
 The peril is to lose the sharpness of analysis. In his terribly succinct but influen-
tial paper “Where is argument?”, Brockriede suggested that for an argument to kick off 
discussants need to have “a choice among two or more competing claims”:  
[…] people who argue have some choice but not too much. If they have too little choice, if a 
belief is entailed by formal logic or required by their status as true believers, they need not 
argue; but if they have too much choice, if they have to deal with choice overload, then ar-
gument may not be very productive. (Brockriede 1975: 181)  
This depiction of an initial situation for an argument has been much criticised for vague-
ness and unclear status (see O’Keefe 1977: 123-125). Yet, on a charitable interpretation 
Brockriede seems to convey the following message: Neither a monological reasoning for 
one option, nor a debate over an infinite set of options can lead to a productive, perhaps 
even reasonable argumentative enterprise. The question remains where to draw the line 
between one and too many. So far the line has been drawn around two dialectical parties. 
The task now is to inspect the possibility of adequately reconstructing, or perhaps even 
modelling, a productive and reasonable argument that involves more than two parties 
pursuing more than two competing claims.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I think the issue that Lewiński addresses in his paper, namely the analysis of the argu-
mentation that occurs in collective deliberations, is well worth attention, and he produces 
reflections about it that illuminate as well as raise important issues. However, I will focus 
mainly on points I question or disagree with, which is a very small subset of the points he 
makes, with a view to advancing the dialectic. 
 The thought experiment that Lewiński uses initially to motivate the paper ends 
with the outcome of a government supposedly arguing reasonably to one party and falla-
ciously to another. “The same arguments in a public debate are both reasonable and falla-
cious at the same time.” I have worries about this particular example. The argument is fal-
lacious to the left-wing party because, going along with the Pragma-Dialectical theory of 
fallacy, one or more discussion rule is violated from its point of view, and it is reasonable 
and not fallacious because none of the discussion rules is violated from the point of view of 
the right-wing party. However, this assumes that the governing party is engaged in argu-
mentation with both parties at once. It seems as plausible to describe the situation as one in 
which the governing party has chosen to ignore the left-wing party and engage in argumen-
tation exclusively with the right-wing party. On that interpretation, the left-wing party is 
left out of the argumentation and is just an onlooker. And in that case there is no apparent 
paradox of reasonableness combined with fallacy. That said, I think Lewiński’s real quarry 
is not an explanation of how the same arguments can be both reasonable and fallacious at 
the same time, but rather how best to model what he in due course defines as “collective 
deliberation.” If that is so, then he can discard this example without loss to his argument. 
2. COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION 
Lewiński defines ‘collective deliberation’ as “a multi-party decision-making procedure 
that necessarily involves public argumentation.”  
 Notice that usually the word ‘deliberation’ refers to an event: deliberation occurs 
over time, with a beginning and an end. A procedure is a set of organizing norms in ac-
cordance with which an event may take place. So it is odd to define deliberation as a pro-
cedure. Notice, too, that by making public argumentation a necessary ingredient in col-
lective deliberation, Lewiński makes the argumentation–deliberation connection true by 
definitional fiat. It seems at least conceivable, however, that multi-party decision-making 
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might occur without any argumentation, so I suggest that this possibility should be left 
open for empirical determination. In brief, the definition of collective deliberation seems 
to need some tweaking. 
 Along with Lewiński’s definition, there are other, different senses of the term 
‘deliberation.’ For another sense, and arguably the classical one, is “reasoning about what 
to do,” and such reasoning doesn’t necessarily involve argumentation in Lewiński’s 
sense, let alone public argumentation. The difference between such deliberation and such 
argumentation is important. Such deliberation occurs in the absence of, and in advance 
of, a decision. The decision is not known before the deliberation begins or while the de-
liberation occurs (even if it is a candidate noted at the outset); the decision is the outcome 
of the deliberation. Argumentation, according to the Pragma-Dialectical perspective with-
in which Lewiński is working, is the attempt to resolve a difference of opinion by per-
suading the other party to give up its standpoint in favour of yours, or to give up its 
doubts about your standpoint. The standpoint of each party is known at the outset of the 
argumentation if it is well-ordered. In this sense of ‘deliberation’ just sketched, a deliber-
ating agent need not use or engage in such argumentation at all. So if argumentation is 
necessarily involved in collective deliberation, that must be deliberation in another sense 
and of a different kind. 
 Consider what might be the minimal conditions for public argumentation within 
collective deliberation. First, the decision or choice is not decided in advance. (When the 
decision is “a foregone conclusion,” we say the deliberation is a sham, bogus, a pretense, 
a mockery of genuine deliberation.) Second, there is some decision-procedure, such as 
some kind of vote (requiring either a consensus, a majority of some degree, or a plurality 
in favour of the decision) that, followed at the end of the deliberation, normally results in 
a decision. Third, there are qualifications for membership in the public or the collective, 
with membership entailing a right either to participate in a discussion about what the de-
cision should be or to vote on proposals, or both. Fourth, there are opportunities for 
members with participatory rights to propose alternatives, to advance reasons in favour of 
and against proposed alternatives, and to critique the reasons advanced by other mem-
bers. Fifth, while it is permissible for any member to advocate for a particular decision, it 
is equally permissible (not ruled out by inconsistency rules) for any member to advance 
arguments on both sides of any proposed decision. That is, a member may engage in the 
discussion by considering alternatives, whether or not he or she has made up his or her 
mind in advance in favour of or against any one of them. Considering arguments both in 
favour of and against any alternative is a way of testing its merits. Notice that the expres-
sion by the same party of arguments on both sides of a choice alternative is different from 
persuasive argumentation, for there is no attempt to persuade; the aim is rather merely to 
expose the pros and cons of the alternative for the purpose of furthering the deliberation.  
 To be sure, public deliberation can occur in contexts in which there are fac-
tions—that is, parties which or who are committed in advance to support a given deci-
sion. This is the situation in the legislatures of most political entities like countries, states 
or provinces, cities, and many other kinds of decision-making bodies. Sometimes there is 
room for amendments to proposals, and so room for persuasive argumentation in support 
of modifications as long as they are, at the least, consistent with the policy commitment 
of the sponsoring party. However, much of the decision-making discussion among such 
factions consists of negotiation argumentation or bargaining, aimed at gaining support for 
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trades and concessions rather than at winning support for the virtues of one favoured de-
cision. Or, to the extent that persuasive argumentation does occur, the intended audi-
ence—the target interlocutor—is some or all of the general public, whose support for the 
measure in question is sought. So public deliberation in which the participants are com-
mitted in advance to some decision or another is different from public deliberation in 
which at least some parties are using the discussion to help them to make up their minds 
about which options are available and, of those, about which one seems best. 
3. MONOLOGUE 
Lewiński’s strategy in considering how best to model the argumentation of collective 
deliberation is to go through what he proposes are the available candidates, which he 
takes to be a monological (or logical) perspective, a dilogical (or dialectical) perspective 
and a polylogical perspective. 
 I think contrasting the so-called logical and the dialectical perspectives makes a 
category mistake. Logic and dialectic are not competitors, and what’s denoted by the term 
‘argument’ as used by logicians (a reason-claim complex) is different from what’s denoted by 
the term ‘argumentation’ as used by argumentation theorists (a communicative interaction). 
 “Many logicians,” says Lewiński, “may be inclined to analyse argumentation as 
a form of monologue.” But argumentation is by definition the exchange of arguments to 
some end, and I don’t know of anyone who would think of an exchange of arguments as a 
monologue. Sometimes an arguer makes an extended case (even a book-length case) 
without interaction with an interlocutor. Such a book, like a speech to a non-interactive 
audience, actually is a monologue. But even so, the arguer, be he or she a writer or a speak-
er, has some audience in mind (even if, simply, anyone), and is almost certain tacitly or 
explicitly to acknowledge objections or challenges to his or her views or arguments, known 
or anticipated, and to respond to them. So the monologue is almost certain to be dialectical.  
 Johnson’s notion of an illative core is taken to typify the non-dialectical logical 
view.
1
 The illative core of an argument is the “this, therefore that” move. But any argu-
ment has an illative core in this sense. This is not due to a “monological” approach or 
interpretation or model; it is due to the nature of argument. If there is no “therefore” 
move, explicit or implicit, there is no argument and so no argumentation. So interest in 
what kinds of “this, therefore that” moves are legitimate and what kind are not (which is 
one topic of logic) is of potential interest to the argumentation theorist who regards ar-
gumentation as dialectical.  
 What is right-minded about Lewiński’s case against logicians and the phantom 
“monological” perspective is that some philosophers used to think that the study of the 
inferential link in arguments is all there is to the study of arguments and some to hold that 
training in formal deductive logic is sufficient to understand the logic of arguments. The 
problem, though, lies not in trying to analyze or model argumentation is non-dialectical; 
it lies in ignoring argumentation. 
  
                                                 
1
  Johnson borrowed the term from Blair (1995). 
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4. DILOGUE 
Turning to the dilogical perspective, Lewiński attacks definitions of the word ‘dialogue’ 
by Blair, Walton and Johnson for failing to accommodate the fact that argumentation can 
involve more than two parties. He says, “What is noticeable in such definitions is that the 
possibility of having more than two discussants is mentioned somewhat timidly and more 
often than not parenthetically,”2 and he calls this a “reduction of argumentative interac-
tions to basically dyadic exchanges.” But a definition of the word ‘dialogue’ does not 
reduce argumentative interactions to two-party exchanges; moreover, the accusation as-
sumes that every dialogue is an argumentative interaction, which is simply false, for not 
all dialogues are argumentative in nature. 
 Lewiński quotes Blair on the limits of the dialogue model of argument with 
qualified approval. I would like to note a passage that he did not quote: 
It will never happen, but it would be nice if the term ‘dialectical’ were reserved for the prop-
erties of all arguments related to their involving doubts or disagreements with at least two 
sides, and the term 'dialogical' were reserved for those belonging exclusively to turn-taking 
verbal exchanges. (1998: 338) 
This is a view I continue to hold. It is one thing to model all argumentation as if it con-
sisted of dialogues (which I think is false), and quite another to hold that all argumenta-
tion is dialectical (which I think is true). Dialogue (typically) involves two parties, and it 
gets cumbersome if the numbers increase very much beyond two; dialectic can involve 
any number of parties, although always some pair of three possible points of view: pro-p, 
contra-p and undecided (with the “contra-p” viewpoint understood to be either just the 
contradictory of p or else some contrary of p). 
5. POLYLOGUE 
Turning to the polylogical perspective, in my opinion it would help to have historical, 
rather than invented, examples. For instance, absent actual examples to the contrary, the 
outside observer gets the impression that what happens in the political arena is that par-
ties negotiate. They seek some compromise position. They do so by trading concessions. 
In the case of minority governments (which entail three or more parties), the government 
must give up enough to one or more of the other parties to win its or their support, on 
pain of being defeated. The government doesn’t appear to persuade by arguments. It wins 
support by (promised) actions and policies that are concessions to the other party’s (or 
parties’) platforms. Agreement is reached if (and only if) each side perceives that it has 
more to gain by compromising than not or by forcing an election. The governing party 
can negotiate with the two or more other parties separately, and act on the best deal it can 
make, or it can negotiate with two or more other parties together. 
 In Canada, the recent minority federal government often won the support of at 
least two of the three opposition parties by including in each Bill enough of the compo-
nents that each party preferred so that, although each party liked and disliked different 
                                                 
2
  By the way, after defining ‘dialogue’ as “a conversation carried on between two or more persons,” the 
Oxford English Dictionary adds the parenthetical comment, “(The tendency is to confine it to two per-
sons, perhaps through associating dia- with di-;….).” 
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components of the Bill, each got enough of what it liked, so that, given a strong disincli-
nation to defeat the government and force an election, the government got those parties’ 
support on that Bill. One could model this situation as the government arguing separately 
with each of the two parties whose approval it calculated it could get and ignoring the 
third party. In each case the government argued that the party preferred the parts of the 
Bill it liked plus not forcing an election, to preventing the parts it disliked plus forcing an 
election. We get a diagram like Lewiński’s: 
                     Government Bill is X (Key measures are ABCD) 
 Oppn  
Party1 
                     Government Oppn  
Party2 
1                              +X  
2 ?X  ?X 
3                             ABCD, so +X  
4 ~CD  ~AC 
  
5  (+AB+no election) > ~CD+election    (+BD+no election) > ~AC+election  
6 +X  +X 
Fig. 1. Example of a Dilogue 
However, almost certainly the government entered into discussions with the two opposi-
tion parties first, and asked questions like, “Here’s what we are proposing (BCEF). Will 
you support it?” And the parties said things like, “We can only support it if you add A” or 
“We can only support it if you take out E.” And the government then responded with 
comments like, “We’ll give you part of A and water E down, how about that?” And so on 
back and forth until provisions ABCD constituted the bill. That is, arguments of the sort 
modeled above almost certainly would be the result of negotiations, not arguments that 
persuaded the parties de novo.  
 Contexts where one may expect polylogical argumentation to occur might in-
clude the following: the annual meeting of a law-firm’s partners in which it is decided 
how to distribute the firm’s profits for the year; a democratically-run university depart-
ment meeting to discuss curriculum reform; a majority-ruled university academic senate 
with authority over curriculum and other academic matters such as promotion and tenure 
regulations; a family trying to make a collective decision about something, say, how to 
spend a vacation together. 
 In the law firm and university situations there will be much argument. Individu-
als will state and defend their preferences, seeking to persuade some or all members of 
the group to agree. If the matter is in the end decided by a vote, as is often the case, peo-
ple’s preferences will be shaped in part by how well they are persuaded by the arguments 
advanced, including the critiques made against those arguments and the rejoinders to 
them, as well as, no doubt, by a sharp eye to their own interests. Arguments may thus be 
addressed to all the members of the group, or to the members of some subset of the 
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group. The argument might be addressed to some individual or sub-group the speaker 
deems influential. The speaker may treat whichever audience he or she is addressing as a 
collective person, possessing all the commitments and other attitudes that are distributed 
through that group which he or she deems pertinent to the argument. Alternatively, the 
speaker can address different arguments to different sub-groups, so long as these arguments 
are consistent. Inconsistent arguments to different sub-groups would be signs of bad faith. 
Arguments can turn out to have unexpected salience, or to meet unexpected resistance. Ad-
dressed to the group as a whole, they might resonate only with a subset, and even be greet-
ed with hostility by another subset—depending on how well the speaker reads the audience 
and frames the argument. (Some of the lines of argument are likely to be strategic, aimed at 
winning enough votes to form a majority, rather than aimed at building a consensus.)  
 But another kind of decision-making process is agreement by consensus. This 
was the method reportedly used by some North American aboriginal tribes and it might 
be the model for family deliberation. Each person has a right to speak to the issue and a 
decision is made only when everyone is prepared to accept it and be bound by it. A 
speaker might use arguments addressed to individuals, to sub-groups or to the entire au-
dience, even though the entire audience are always the auditors of the argumentation. The 
purpose of addressing an individual or sub-group might be to try to win over a particular-
ly influential party, or it might be to discredit or refute a particularly influential party in 
the eyes of the larger group. Again, consistency is a constraint. 
 Who it is that the speaker addresses, and which arguments are used, will partly 
be a function of the decision-making procedure. If the matter is decided by majority vote, 
the strategy might be different from what it would be if the matter were decided by con-
sensus. Also, speakers can vary in how well they know their audience. Thus speakers 
sometimes push on open doors, or vainly try to open doors fastened shut. 
 Also, an intervention during one or another of such deliberative discussions can 
hang together as a unit, even though it contains several lines of argument, and even though 
it has arguments aimed at different constituencies among the members of the audience. For 
instance, a proposal might be defended on grounds that give something to each interested 
party and also call for sacrifices of interests by all, and so be admired by all for its even-
handed distribution of benefits and burdens. This property would not be apparent if each 
individual line of argument were analyzed separately. There would have to be a sort of 
mega-profile envisaged, if the argumentation were to be analyzed as a dialogue profile. 
 Nothing Lewiński says is inconsistent with these suggestions, I think, but it does 
seem to me that his theorizing, even its normative aspects, will become more plausible 
and useful if it is based on and grounded in case studies. 
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